University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 83

Issue 4

Article 10

August 2015

If I Go Crazy, Then Will You Still Call Me a Super PAC? How
Enmeshment with Political Action Committees Makes
Contribution Limits Enforceable on Independent Expenditure-Only
Committees
Brian Greivenkamp
University of Cincinnati Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Nonprofit Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brian Greivenkamp, If I Go Crazy, Then Will You Still Call Me a Super PAC? How Enmeshment with Political
Action Committees Makes Contribution Limits Enforceable on Independent Expenditure-Only
Committees, 83 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1445 (2015)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/10

This Student Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of
Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information,
please contact ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Greivenkamp: If I Go Crazy, Then Will You Still Call Me a Super PAC? How Enme

IF I GO CRAZY, THEN WILL YOU STILL CALL ME A SUPER
PAC? HOW ENMESHMENT WITH POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITTEES MAKES CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ENFORCEABLE
ON INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE-ONLY COMMITTEES
Brian Greivenkamp*

I. INTRODUCTION
Campaign finance is a confusing and often intimidating area of the
law. Even attempting to discuss the subject with the uninitiated requires
a fair deal of knowledge of complicated acronyms and technical terms
of art. Despite the difficulty of discussing campaign finance without
this background, the subject’s importance is becoming increasingly
evident. In the 2012 presidential election, the playing field faced
radically different parameters than those faced a mere four years before.
As the 2016 election begins to loom large on the horizon, it is important
for those participating in political elections, as well as sociallyconscious citizens, to understand how political campaigns are financed
and what restrictions campaigns face.
The difference between political action committees (PACs) and
independent expenditure-only committees (commonly known as Super
PACs) is one of the most confusing aspects of campaign finance law. A
PAC is generally an organization that coordinates with a candidate
regarding his or her election, possibly in conjunction with a specific
political issue. These committees are highly regulated in terms of what
they may accept as contributions and what sort of expenditures they may
make on behalf of candidates.1 Super PACs, in contrast, are generally
neither limited by what contributions they may accept, nor what
expenditures they may make.2 One of the major distinctions that
differentiate a Super PAC from an ordinary PAC is that a Super PAC
may neither coordinate with a candidate nor make contributions directly
to a candidate’s campaign.3 Therefore, the general function of a Super
PAC is to purchase advertisements which promote a candidate, attack an
opposing candidate, or address the validity of a candidate’s messages.
Most candidates in a major election have a Super PAC that is closely
associated with the candidate’s campaign.4 As long as the Super PAC
* Associate Member, 2014–2015 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. 2 U.S.C.A§ 431 (1971) (current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (2014)).
2. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3. Id. at 47.
4. See Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 EMORY L.J.
781, 786 (2014).
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does not coordinate with the candidate or an agent of the candidate, this
relationship is legal.5 Occasionally, however, Super PACs develop as a
branch of an already existing PAC, ostensibly for the purpose of
working toward a mutual goal.6 These related organizations have been
known to share directors, bank accounts, and fundraising ventures.7
Recent jurisprudence on the issue has posited that this closely enmeshed
relationship is also legal.8 In the summer of 2014, a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit, Vermont Right to
Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, created a circuit split on this issue,
holding that contribution limits to PACs also apply to Super PACs if the
latter is functionally indistinguishable from the former.9
This Casenote examines whether the Second Circuit’s holding in
Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell was correct, and
whether other circuits should adopt its holding. Part II discusses the
background surrounding the jurisprudence of contribution limits
imposed on Super PACs. Part III discusses Vermont Right to Life
Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, and why the Second Circuit decided to break
away from persuasive authority on the issue of contribution limits. Part
IV examines the major arguments in favor of the Second Circuit’s
opinion. In Part V, this Casenote outlines potential drawbacks to the
Second Circuit’s findings and analyzes whether or not considerations
made by other circuits may outweigh the Second Circuit’s rationale.
Finally, this Casenote will conclude by stating that the Second Circuit’s
holding is the correct one and should be adopted by other circuits in the
future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Election Campaign Act
The 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) imposed the first
regulations on PACs.10 FECA established the principle that persons,
whether they are individuals or corporations, can contribute only a
certain predetermined amount to a political action committee over the
course of a calendar year.11 This same statute sets out important
5. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314
(2010).
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id.
See N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008).
Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 141.
2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (1971) (current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (2014)).
Id. Part 11 of this statute clarifies that “person” refers to committees and corporations as well
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definitions for the terms “contribution,” “expenditure,” and
“independent expenditure”. The statute defines a contribution as, “any
gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of
value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office.”12 For the purposes of this Casenote, the term
“contribution” refers to a gift of money either by an individual or
corporation to a PAC committee.
FECA defines an “expenditure” as “any purchase, payment,
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of
value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election
for Federal office; and a written contract, promise, or agreement to make
an expenditure.”13 These sorts of expenditures can be anything given
out by a political committee, including direct financial gifts to
campaigns. An “independent expenditure,” on the other hand, is defined
as an expenditure “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate; and that is not made in concert or
cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the
candidate's authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political
party committee or its agents.”14 Independent expenditures are almost
always advertisements or pamphlets produced by a political committee.
B. United States Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court’s Super PAC jurisprudence dates back to 1976.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a
ceiling on independent expenditures, stating that the absence of
coordination with the candidate “alleviates the danger that expenditures
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate.”15 California Medical Association v. FEC (Cal-Med) also
emphasized that same point.16
In Cal-Med, Justice Blackmun,
concurring with the plurality’s opinion, in part, and concurring in the
judgment, articulated that political corruption is the only constitutional
motivation for limiting political contributions and that the limitations
must be “no broader than necessary to achieve that interest.”17
As recently as April of 2014, the United States Supreme Court has
continued to hold that the motivation to reduce quid pro quo

as individuals.
12. Id. at 30101(8)(A)(i).
13. Id. at 30101(9)(A)(i–ii).
14. Id. at 30101(17)(A–B).
15. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
16. California Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
17. Id. at 203 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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arrangements, or the appearance of such arrangements, is the only
constitutionally permissible motivation by which the federal government
may restrict campaign contributions.18 However, no United States
Supreme Court case has held that the possibility of quid pro quo
arrangements is sufficient rationale to limit the amount that an
individual or a corporation may contribute to a Super PAC.19
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the fact that an individual or organization has
“influence over or access to” a candidate does not mean that the
candidate is presumed corrupt.20 Furthermore, the Court stated that any
possibility of corruption is outweighed by the chilling effect a
contribution limit would impose on the free speech of the contributor.21
In a subsequent case, The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit summarized Citizens United by stating that, since
expenditures by independent expenditure-only groups do not create the
appearance of corruption, “there is no corrupting ‘quid’ for which a
candidate might in exchange offer a corrupt ‘quo.’”22 Therefore,
because there is no reason to believe that such expenditures would
create even the appearance of corruption, it is not constitutionally
permissible to limit contributions to groups that only make independent
expenditures.23
Many of these Supreme Court cases discuss the balancing act that
campaign finance regulations must maintain between limiting the
presence or appearance of corruption and the First Amendment rights of
committees. In one such case, Buckley v. Valeo, the Court regarded
campaign contributions as political expression, a type of speech which is
“integral to the operation of the system of government established by
our Constitution.”24 As such, it deemed that any regulations over the
subject “operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities.”25 As a general rule, courts have erred on the side of
protecting First Amendment rights, stating that the chilling effect
produced by regulations outweighs the interest in preventing
corruption.26 The interest in preventing corruption is especially small if
the regulations are imposed on a committee that makes independent

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314.
Id. at 357.
SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 695.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
Id.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
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expenditures which, by definition, cannot be coordinated with a
candidate.27 As such, the Supreme Court has held that independent
expenditures do not give rise to the existence or the appearance of
corruption, even if the independent expenditures are made by a forprofit corporation.28
C. The Fourth Circuit: North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake
In 2008, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. (NCRL) challenged the
constitutionality of certain aspects of North Carolina campaign finance
law in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake.29 NCRL was formed
in 1973 for the purposes of educating the public about abortion,
euthanasia, and protecting the sanctity of human life.30 NCRL has two
affiliate organizations, each of which were also plaintiffs in this case.
The first of these affiliates was the North Carolina Right to Life Political
Action Committee (NCRL-PAC). The second affiliate was the North
Carolina Right to Life Committee Fund for Independent Political
Expenditures (NCRL-FIPE). While these organizations were admittedly
affiliated with NCRL, they were each their own distinct legal entities,
set up to function as a PAC and a Super PAC, respectively. 31
This case came to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit on appeal from a string of earlier decisions. Among other
claims, the plaintiffs challenged attempts by the state of North Carolina
to enforce a provision of North Carolina’s General Statute §163-278
against NCRL-FIPE.32 The statute in question establishes the limits on
contributions made by, or accepted by, political committees.33 The
plaintiffs claimed that NCRL-FIPE was an independent expenditureonly committee and was, therefore, exempt from the statute’s
limitations.34
The state of North Carolina challenged the district court’s decision
that enforcing contribution limits against NCRL-FIPE was
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2008).
30. About Us, N. CAROLINA RIGHT TO LIFE, INC., http://ncrtl.org/the-organization/ (last visited,
Sep. 25, 2014).
31. Leake, 525 F.3d at 278.
32. Id. at 278–79 (referencing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163–278.13 (West).). Plaintiffs’ other
claims were that North Carolina was unconstitutionally regulating issue advocacy by attempting to
determine whether communications supported or opposed a particular candidate and that North Carolina
was attempting to enforce an unconstitutional definition of “political committee” by threatening to
impose certain obligations on groups which were not focused on nominating or electing political
candidates.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.13 (West).
34. Leake 525 F.3d at 279.
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unconstitutional.35
The state asserted that NCRL-FIPE had an
“interwoven relationship” with NCRL and NCRL-PAC, and that it
defied common sense to believe that expenditures made by NCRL-FIPE
would be independent of contributions made by the other two groups. 36
As a result, the state claimed that it was necessary to enforce
contribution limits against NCRL-FIPE to avoid circumvention of those
contribution limits by NCRL and NCRL-PAC, and to prevent corruption
or the appearance of corruption.37
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme
Court had never held that contribution limits could apply to an
independent expenditure-only committee.38 The court went on to say
that, although NCRL-FIPE shared staff and facilities with the other
plaintiffs in this suit, NCRL-FIPE’s independence from these other
groups, as a matter of law, was sufficient to qualify it for the privileges
afforded to independent expenditure-only committees.39 The Court
contended that, absent evidence of abuse of its legal status, the Court
had no intention of piercing NCRL-FIPE’s corporate veil.40 Since there
was no such evidence, the Court declined to impose any contribution
limitations on NCRL-FIPE but maintained that it would approve of such
limitations if it were proven that an organization was abusing its
corporate form.41
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Michael disagreed with the idea that the
groups should be allowed to enjoy their legal distinctness until evidence
of corruption arose. He pointed out that NCRL-FIPE shared some of its
most important resources with its sister groups, including facilities,
directors, and staff.42 The groups were so interrelated, he observed, that
their executive meetings and board meetings addressed the needs of all
three groups, simultaneously.43 He reasoned that it would be difficult to
imagine that an executive could coordinate with a candidate in her role
as a PAC board member and then operate in her role as a Super PAC
board member without that coordination somehow leaking through.44
The court’s holding, he stated, gave organizations an “explicit green
35. Id. at 280 (referencing N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 482 F. Supp. 2d 686, 692
(E.D.N.C. 2007) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008)).
36. Defendants-Appellees Opening and Answering Brief, at 52, North Carolina Right to Life v.
Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1438) 2007 WL 2406591 (C.A.4).
37. Leake, 525 F.3d at 280.
38. Id. at 292 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)).
39. Id. at 294 n.8.
40. Id. at 306
41. Id. at 306.
42. Id. at 336 (dissenting opinion).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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light” to exploit a “legal loophole.”45 The entire process, therefore,
undermined the idea that campaign finance laws should prevent the
“appearance and reality of corruption.”46
D. The D.C. Circuit: Emily’s List and Stop this Insanity
1. Emily’s List v. Federal Election Commission
In a 2009 case, Emily’s List v. Federal Election Commission, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals determined whether an organization is able to
make both direct, coordinated expenditures and also independent
expenditures, thus fulfilling the roles of both a PAC and a Super PAC
without creating two distinct legal entities.47 Emily’s List is a
progressive organization that attempts to help women get elected to
public office if it believes the individual “can make significant
contributions to education, health care, voting rights, and economic
equality.”48 Emily’s List considers itself a “hybrid non-profit.”49 As
such, Emily’s List would make both direct contributions to candidates,
as well as expenditures “for advertisements, get-out-the-vote efforts, and
voter registration drives.”50 On the one hand, it could only accept
limited contributions to fund its activities as a PAC. 51 On the other
hand, it would not limit contributions made by parties for the purpose of
funding its activities as a Super PAC.52
The D.C. Circuit ruled that an entity which makes expenditures as a
PAC does not forfeit its rights to make separate expenditures as a Super
PAC.53 The court cited First Amendment concerns, noting that the First
Amendment rights of Emily’s List were not lost when it made a direct
coordinated expenditure to a candidate’s campaign.54 Rather, the court
stated that Emily’s List, and organizations like it, may be required to set
up separate bank accounts for their activities as PACs and their activities
as Super PACs.55 The court’s reasoning was that separate bank accounts
would make it easier for Emily’s List to keep funding for its dual
45. Id.
46. Id. at 337.
47. Emily's List v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
48. What We Do, EMILY’S LIST, http://www.emilyslist.org/pages/entry/what-we-do (last visited,
Oct. 13, 2014).
49. Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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purposes separate, thus ensuring that donor contributions would be
subject to the appropriate contribution limits.56 However, the court also
stated that any laws requiring hybrid groups to direct contributions to
separate bank accounts must be tailored to ensure that the hybrid group
is not disadvantaged as compared to a pure expenditures-only nonprofit.57 The court noted that the desire to create a bright-line rule
would not justify an infringement of the group’s First Amendment
rights.58
2. Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Federal
Election Commission
Despite the holding in Emily’s List, the question of whether separate
bank accounts sufficiently separate indistinguishable groups has not
been resolved in the D.C. Circuit. In a 2012 case, Stop This Insanity,
Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Federal Election Commission, a
District of Columbia district court disagreed with the holding in Emily’s
List.59 Stop This Insanity, Inc. (Stop This Insanity) is a corporation
created by the “Tea Party” for the purpose of taking power away from
elected officials and returning it to the people.60 Stop This Insanity
attempted to set up a “connected” political action committee called Stop
This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund (the Leadership Fund),
which would function as a hybrid political action committee and
independent expenditure committee, much like the committee discussed
in Emily’s List.61 Stop This Insanity wanted their group to be treated
like the hybrid group in Emily’s List so that it could be exempt from
contribution limitations when acting as a Super PAC. To this effect, the
Leadership Fund sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would
allow it to accept unlimited contributions in their capacity as an
independent expenditures-only committee.62
In order to prepare the Leadership Fund for its utilization as a Super
PAC, Stop This Insanity wanted to set up separate bank accounts in the
belief that it was following the guidelines set out by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals.63 Stop This Insanity contended that Emily’s List was
56. Id.
57. Id. at 17.
58. Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)).
59. Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 902 F. Supp.
2d 23 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 761 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
60. About TheTeaParty.net, THETEAPARTY.NET, http://www.theteaparty.net/about-the-tea-party/
(last visited, Oct. 13, 2014).
61. Stop This Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
62. Id. at 26–27.
63. Id. at 28.
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controlling precedent in the case at hand, at least insofar as it applied to
contribution limits.64
The district court declined to adopt any of the holdings of Emily’s List
as they applied to contribution limits, referring to the D.C. Circuit’s
discussion of the topic as “pure dicta.”65 The court also found this case
to be distinguishable from Emily’s List, because the hybrid group in
Emily’s List never attempted to take any actions that amounted to
express advocacy of an individual federal candidate.66 The court
expressed concerns regarding the appearance of corruption, stating that
such concerns are at their “zenith”67 when organizations contribute
directly to candidates or their campaigns because there is an “inherently
stronger nexus to particular candidates”68 when express advocacy is
involved.
The court also noted that Citizens United allowed
corporations to have significantly more liberties in the field of campaign
finance, which placed even more emphasis on the prevention of
corruption in campaign finance cases.69
As a result, unlike Emily’s List, the court held in Stop This Insanity
that the existence of separate bank accounts was “simply insufficient to
overcome the appearance that the entity is in cahoots with the candidates
and parties that it coordinates with and supports.”70 The court cited the
average American’s current disillusionment with the area of campaign
finance, stating that any holding indicating that the mere presence of
separate bank accounts precluded a hybrid organization from
participating in improper behavior was “naïve and simply out of
touch.”71 However, this decision did not limit what Stop This Insanity
could do by creating a legally distinct Super PAC, stating explicitly that
the organization could easily do so and receive contributions in
“unlimited amounts.”72 The fact that this proposed hypothetical Super
PAC would still be enmeshed financially and organizationally with Stop
This Insanity was not discussed by the Court.
In summary, no bright line rule emerges from the D.C. Circuit based
on these two cases. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
subsequently affirmed Stop This Insanity, but made no mention of the
application of contribution limits to functionally indistinguishable

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
Id.
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groups.73 It is clear that, even by the D.C. Circuit’s most restrictive
standards, an organization need only create two legally distinct
committees, one of which is a Super PAC, to ensure that their committee
be allowed to accept unlimited contributions and make unlimited
independent expenditures. Under this standard, the committees set up
by North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. would unquestionably be
permitted.
III. NOT INDEPENDENT ENOUGH: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN
VERMONT RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE V. SORRELL
The Vermont Right to Life Committee (VRLC) was formed in 1971
to represent the interests of individuals opposed to abortion and
euthanasia.74 In 1999, the VRLC formed the Vermont Right to LifeFund for Independent Political Expenditures (VRLC-FIPE) for the
purpose of making unlimited political expenditures that were not
coordinated with any specific candidates.75 Later, the VRLC formed
another entity called the Vermont Right to Life, Inc. Political Committee
(VRLC-PC) which was formed with the purpose of donating direct
expenditures to candidates and their campaigns.76 The two committees
function as a Super PAC and a PAC, respectively, of VRLC. Though
VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are legally distinct, they share much of the
same leadership.77 The suit was brought against the Vermont Attorney
General to contest, amongst other things, the enforcement of
contribution limits as applied to VRLC-FIPE.78 VRLC and VRLC-FIPE
contended that, since VRLC-FIPE was a Super PAC, it was exempt
from contribution limits. The organizations also argued that the
application of contribution limits infringed upon VRLC-FIPE’s freedom
of speech.79
The Second Circuit observed that, while VRLC-PC and VRLC-FIPE
were legally distinct entities, they were significantly enmeshed with
each other.80 To reach this conclusion, the court looked to the specific
circumstances surrounding the two entities. First, it analyzed the
evidence that VRLC-FIPE presented to distinguish itself from VRCL73. Stop This Insanity Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 761 F.3d 10
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
74. About Us, VERMONT RIGHT TO LIVE COMM., http://www.vrlc.net/about/ (last visited, Sep.
25, 2014).
75. Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118. 122 (2d Cir. 2014).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 143–44.
78. Id. at 121.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 144.
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PC: organizational documents distinguishing the two committees as
separate creations of VRLC and the existence of separate bank
accounts.81 The court held that these two facts, alone, were not enough
to overcome substantial evidence that the two organizations were
enmeshed.
The court stated that, in order to find that two groups were enmeshed
financially, a number of factors ought to be considered, including “the
overlap of staff and resources, the lack of financial independence, the
coordination of activities, and the flow of information between the
entities.”82 The State submitted numerous depositions, financial reports,
emails, meeting minutes, and expert reports to support the accusation
that the two entities were significantly enmeshed.83 In these materials,
the State established that there was a “fluidity of funds” between VRLCPC and VRLC-FIPE, meaning that funds would be transferred from
VRLC-PC to VRLC-FIPE when necessary.84 Additionally, on at least
one occasion in 2008, the two groups shared a joint fundraising
venture.85
As well as finding evidence that the organizations were enmeshed
financially, the court also held that the evidence illustrated that VRLCPC and VRLC-FIPE were enmeshed organizationally. While it would
not be improper for the two groups to exist as sister subsidiaries of
VRLC, an accountant for the state established that VRLC held
“complete control” over the groups’ structures and finances.86
Furthermore, the court found that the leadership of the two committees
contained substantial overlap in terms of both personnel and
communication.87 Additionally, there was evidence that the groups
participated in specific activities, such as the production of voter guides,
in total concert with each other.88 Finally, the court found it telling that
VRLC-FIPE never made any effort to break the lines of communication
“between the candidate, VRLC, and VRLC-PC.”89 Based on these facts,
each of which went undisputed by the plaintiffs, the court determined
that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC were enmeshed financially and
organizationally.90
Accordingly, the Second Circuit reasoned that, because contribution
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
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limits were constitutionally applied to VRLC-PC, those same
contribution limits must be applied to VRLC-FIPE.91 The court noted
that the traditional reason that Super PACs were deemed unlikely to
give rise to quid pro quo corruption was a lack of “prearrangement and
The court
coordination” with candidates or their campaigns. 92
concluded that, in order to ensure that such prearrangement and
coordination did not exist, there must be, at a minimum, some
“organizational separation” between the PAC and the corresponding
Super PAC.93 Based on the factors considered above, the court
concluded that VRLC-FIPE was “functionally indistinguishable” from
VRLC-PC and that this organizational separation was not present.94 As
a result of this enmeshment, the court stated that concerns about favors
exchanged quid pro quo for expenditures could apply to both groups
equally.95 Therefore, the court concluded that any contribution limits to
which VRLC-PC was subject also applied to VRLC-FIPE.96
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN VERMONT RIGHT TO LIFE
COMMITTEE V. SORRELL IS NARROWLY TAILORED, AVOIDS
INFRINGMENT ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS, AND IS EASILY
APPLICABLE TO FUTURE CASES
This Casenote advocates the adoption of the Second Circuit’s holding
in Vermont Right to Life Committee v. Sorrell. This recommendation is
based mainly on four observations drawn from the case holding. First, it
is significant that the court narrowed its holding to address concerns of
quid pro quo corruption. Second, the court’s holding does not raise
significant First Amendment concerns. Third, the standard of functional
indistinguishableness is well-defined and easily applied. Finally, the
court’s holding has strong common sense appeal which comes full circle
to reducing the appearance of general political corruption.
A. Narrow Focus on Preventing Quid Pro Quo Corruption
Other circuits should adopt the position of the Second Circuit because
it is properly focused on the goal of preventing the existence or
appearance of quid pro quo corruption. Since VRLC-FIPE makes only
independent expenditures, it is the type of committee which courts have
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 141.
Id. (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 345, 357–61 (2010)).
Id. at 142.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.
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traditionally held unlikely to create the appearance of corruption.97
However, the Second Circuit was very careful to emphasize the special
circumstances of this case which made it more likely than usual that
corruption could either exist or be perceived to exist. Emphasizing the
specific facts of the case at hand, the Second Circuit demonstrated that
VRLC-FIPE should not be afforded the same benefit of the doubt
normally afforded to Super PACs.
The Court makes clear that VRLC-FIPE only cultivates the air of
corruption through its connections to VRLC and VRLC-PC. The
“fluidity of funds” between the three groups suggested circumvention of
the regulations governing the different organizations in their individual
capacities.98 Examination of the groups’ meeting minutes revealed that
they did not regard their streams of funding as separate, resulting in at
least one incident where VLRC-FIPE and VRLC-PC held a joint
fundraising event.99 These connections support the holding that the
organizations were enmeshed financially.
Furthermore, the groups were enmeshed organizationally. The court
noted that VRLC held complete control over leadership positions of
both groups.100 Members of either committee were chosen by the
president of VRLC and approved by VRLC’s board. VRLC-PC and
VRLC-FIPE met at the same place at the same time and were known to
discuss campaign issues together.101 The groups contained substantial
overlap in membership, with at least two examples of members
attending both meetings.102 Perhaps most tellingly was the nexus of
communication that existed throughout the groups. VRLC and VRLCPC were each known to coordinate with candidates, as was their right.
However, there is no point at which VRLC-FIPE separated itself from
these lines of communication, calling into serious question whether
VRLC-FIPE was actually able to function without having coordinated
with candidates.103 This set of facts led the Court to make a
determination that the various groups were enmeshed organizationally.
Based on these two sets of facts, the Court determined that VRLCFIPE’s connections with VRLC and VRLC-PC distinguished VRLCFIPE from typical groups which make only independent expenditures.
In fact, VRLC-FIPE’s financial organizational enmeshment with the
other groups created a situation where the three groups were
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 143.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
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“functionally indistinguishable.”104 In such a case, the likelihood of
corruption or the appearance of corruption is significantly greater than in
a scenario where Super PAC exists outside of such a connection. The
court reasoned that Super PACs were typically held to be less likely to
give rise to corruption because of their mandated lack of communication
with candidates.105 When groups are so significantly connected, the
assurance of a lack of communication vanishes and concerns of
corruption reemerge. Were VRLC-FIPE to disconnect from the other
two groups, it would no longer be an organization that made likely the
existence or the perceived existence of corruption.
This analysis is one of the key strengths of the Second Circuit’s
holding. If the court had based its holding on another motivation for
enforcing contribution limits on a Super PAC, the limits would not have
been, nor should they have been, enforceable. For example, if the court
had held that they were enforcing contribution limits as a way of
punishing VRLC for attempting to circumvent legal restrictions or as a
way of reducing the amount of money in politics, those motivations
would be arguably unconstitutional, resulting in an unenforceable
holding.106 Instead, the court properly aligned its holding with the only
constitutionally valid motivation for enforcing contribution limits upon
Super PACs, thus providing a compelling reason for other circuits to
follow in its footsteps.
B. First Amendment Concerns
While the interest in preventing corruption is heightened in cases
involving indistinguishable groups, the corresponding limitation on First
Amendment rights is comparatively low. First Amendment rights in the
field of campaign finance concern the abilities of committees to express
themselves politically.107
Normally, courts enforce contribution
limitations on organizations like VRLC-FIPE in the interest of
preventing possible corruption. These limitations, however, prevent
parties from expressing as much financial support for an issue or
candidate as they are constitutionally permitted to express.
Accordingly, courts are generally reluctant to limit a Super PAC’s
ability to express financial support through the use of contribution
limits.108
However, in the case at hand, the only concerns that exist regarding
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 145.
Id.
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
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corruption are directly tied to VRLC-FIPE’s attachments to VRLC and
VRLC-PC. If VRLC-FIPE were to remove itself from the financial and
organizational enmeshments that entangled it with the other two groups,
its ability to receive unlimited contributions would remain uninhibited
by the court. Although requiring this sort of separation does impose
some hardship on committees that operate with “low funding levels,
small staff, and few resources,”109 the court held that preventing
potential quid pro quo corruption outweighed these hardships.110
C. The Functionally Indistinguishable Standard
In order for other courts to follow the holding of the Second Circuit,
there must be a clear standard for them to apply. In short, The Second
Circuit held that a Super PAC that is “functionally indistinguishable”
from a group subject to contribution limits may itself have to abide by
those contribution limits.111 This holding, however, did not instruct
other circuits on the means of determining whether a committee is
“functionally indistinguishable” from another entity. If other circuits are
to be expected conform to this holding, then the term “functionally
indistinguishable” ought to be clearly defined.
As discussed previously, there are two types of enmeshment that the
Second Circuit discussed in finding that VRLC-FIPE is functionally
indistinguishable from VRLC-PC: financial enmeshment and
organizational enmeshment.112 When the Court discussed VRLCFIPE’s financial enmeshment, it considered factors such as the fluidity
of funds between the groups and the committees’ joint fundraising
goals.113 Therefore, it is clear from the court’s discussion what
constitutes financial enmeshment.
When the court discusses
organizational enmeshment, it considered factors such as the overlap in
staff and oversight, as well as the unbroken lines of communication.114
Therefore, the court clearly laid out what facts lead to a finding of
organizational enmeshment. Because both terms are arguably defined
within the Second Circuit’s opinion, it seems as though “functionally
indistinguishable” is merely the sum of these two types of enmeshment.
However, the arithmetic may not be quite that simple.
At no point in the court’s opinion did it make any explicit statement
that functional indistinguishableness is the sum of financial and
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118. 145 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 143–44.
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organizational enmeshment.
From its previous discussions, this
equation may feel implied and even intuitive, but the court’s failure to
expressly define the elements of the equation may be the largest and
most important ambiguity in its holding. For example, the court never
says whether both types of enmeshment are essential for a group to be
functionally indistinguishable. It seems logical that two groups could be
functionally indistinguishable if the boards were entirely different, yet
there existed a fluidity of funds and joint fundraising goals. Likewise,
two groups that kept entirely separate funds but were composed of the
same board members and had unbroken lines of communication could
just as easily be believed to be functionally indistinguishable.
To further complicate matters, all of the elements of this hypothetical
exercise seem to exist on the extreme edge of impermissibility. The
court makes no mention of how much connection constitutes
enmeshment. In other words, though the equation appears to be fairly
simple, better definitions of its elements would be preferable, especially
if the holding is to be adopted by other circuits. Nevertheless, the
individual factors of the equation are sufficiently well-defined enough to
allow other circuits to replicate the Second Circuit’s holding.
D. Common Sense Element
The Second Circuit’s common sense approach to campaign finance is
a deceptively simple argument in favor of the holding. In an area of the
law where one of the only constitutional rationales for enforcing a law is
to prevent the appearance of corruption, a holding’s common sense
appeal is actually a fairly compelling argument in its favor.
Furthermore, in an era where courts have explicitly cited Americans’
disillusionment with campaign finance, it is essential that holdings
which rule on the appearance of corruption make intuitive sense to the
average observer.115 A holding which allowed a committee to reap the
benefits of being a Super PAC while simultaneously retaining all the
benefits of a PAC would strike observing citizens as just another
instance of the game being rigged. Forcing legislatures to close this
potential loophole is something that would appeal to this sort of
observant citizen and is an action that represents a significant step
toward reducing the appearance of corruption in the field of campaign
finance.

115. Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 902 F. Supp.
2d 23, 26 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 761 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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V. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
There are several logical counter-arguments that oppose the Second
Circuit’s holding. While these counter-arguments are important and
must be addressed, this Casenote asserts that the Second Circuit’s
holding in Vermont Right to Life Committee v. Sorrell provides the best
solution to the issue of whether courts can limit contributions made to
Super PACs that are deemed functionally indistinguishable from other
PACs. The first of these counter-arguments is that the Second Circuit
interferes with VRLC-FIPE’s ability to exercise its Freedom of
Expression. The second counter-argument is that the Second Circuit did
not create a circuit split, but instead merely agreed with the holding of
the Fourth Circuit in Leake. The final counter-argument is that the
Second Circuit’s holding will reduce neither the existence of nor the
appearance of corruption.
A. The Second Circuit’s Holding Infringes of VRLC-FIPE’s Ability
to Exercise its Freedom of Expression
One argument against the Second Circuit’s holding is that it infringes
on the freedom of speech of independent expenditures-only committees.
As the Supreme Court stated in McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Commission, a party’s right to participate in elections is protected by the
First Amendment.116 However, this right may be abridged when it
becomes necessary to avoid the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption.117 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court expressed concern
that placing expenditure limits upon groups that made independent
expenditures would have a chilling effect on the groups’ exercise of
freedom of speech.118 The Court determined that such concerns
outweighed any concern regarding the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption.119 Likewise, the court in Emily’s List expressed concern
over the application of contribution limits to hybrid groups, holding that
a group that made independent expenditures “does not suddenly forfeit
its First Amendment rights when it decides also to make direct
contributions to parties or candidates.”120
These opinions demonstrate that placing contribution limits on Super
PACs raises significant First Amendment concerns. One could argue
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
Id.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
Id.
Emily's List v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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that these concerns may continue to outweigh concerns over the
appearance of quid pro quo corruption, even after a group has been
deemed functionally indistinguishable from a group on which
contribution limitations apply. However, when groups are so closely
enmeshed as to be functionally indistinguishable, it ought to raise an
especially high level of concern about the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption.
Super PACs that are functionally indistinguishable from regular
PACs have a line of communication to the candidate which is highly
suggestive of coordination. In Sorrell, the Court observed that there was
no point where VRLC-FIPE distanced itself from the lines of
communication between the VRLC and VRLC-PC, and the candidates
with which those committees coordinated their expenditures.121 This
nexus of communication makes it increasingly improbable in the eyes of
the general public that VRLC-FIPE was not coordinating with political
candidates. As stated by Judge Michael’s dissent in Leake, holding that
a group may be exempt from contribution limits and simultaneously
enmeshed with a group allowed to make direct contributions to political
campaigns is a “complete rejection” of the government’s interest in
“limiting the influence of money in politics to prevent the appearance
and reality of corruption.”122 Therefore, because the appearance of quid
pro quo corruption is abnormally high in situations of functionally
indistinguishable committees, the possibility that limiting contributions
to independent expenditure-only committees might produce a chilling
effect of the exercise of freedom of speech should not outweigh the
importance of limiting the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.
B. No Circuit Split was Created by the Second Circuit’s Holding
Another argument against the Sorrell holding is that no circuit split
was created by the Second Circuit, but rather the Second Circuit is
following wording found in the dicta of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in
Leake. In Leake, the state argued that NCRL-FIPE was “closely
entwined” with the NCRL and the NCRL-PAC.123 The Fourth Circuit
declined to address this argument, stating that the state was asking the
court to pierce the organization’s corporate veil. The court did state,
however, that it may have elected to conduct such an inquiry had the
state been able to introduce into its arguments “any evidence that the
plaintiffs are abusing their legal forms or ‘any legal authority that
121. Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118. 144 (2d Cir. 2014).
122. N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) (dissenting
opinion).
123. Id. at 294, n.8.
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considers [political committees] and their sponsoring corporation as
identical entities.’”124
It can be argued that this language from the Fourth Circuit does not
run contrary to the holdings of the Second Circuit but, rather, serves as
an introduction to the Second Circuit’s analysis of an organization that
abused its legal form. A close reading of the Second Circuit’s
breakdown of VRLC-FIPE’s interactions with VRLC-PC reveals several
instances that could be interpreted as the two organizations abusing their
legal forms. Of particular interest is the stated “fluidity of funds” that
existed between the groups’ bank accounts.125 The argument might
therefore be made that, had the Fourth Circuit been presented with the
facts from Sorrell, they may have reached the same outcome as the
Second Circuit.
Even so, it would be a mistake to interpret the courts’ holdings as
being congruent. The crux of the Second Circuit’s holding is not that
VRLC-FIPE abused its legal status, but that it had become so enmeshed
with VRLC-PC and VRLC that it could no longer be trusted to enjoy its
status as an independent expenditure-only committee for fear of the
appearance of quid pro quo corruption.126 A legitimate question exists
as to whether the Second Circuit’s idea of enmeshment can occur
without abuse of a legal form. The Second Circuit mentioned two types
of enmeshment: financial enmeshment and organizational
enmeshment.127 In his dissenting opinion in Leake, Judge Michael
observed that NCRL-FIPE shared many important resources with NCRL
and NCRL-PAC, some of which were facilities, directors, and staff .128
These sorts of non-financial resources are the types of resources that the
Second Circuit referred to when it discussed organizational
enmeshment.
Because it would seem that organizational enmeshment was present
in Leake and the arrangement in Leake was not held to be improper, it
should follow that organizational enmeshment does not equal abuse of
legal forms. Therefore, it would seem that the Fourth Circuit considered
abuse of legal forms as something more akin to financial enmeshment.
Though it is unclear whether the Second Circuit‘s holding would have
been different had the two organizations were found to be only
organizationally enmeshed, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest
that financial enmeshment is a necessary element of finding that the
124. Id. (citing North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 482 F.Supp.2d 686, 699
(E.D.N.C.2007)).
125. Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 143.
126. Id. at 145.
127. Id. at 141.
128. Leake, 525 F.3d at 336 (dissenting opinion).
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organizations were “functionally indistinguishable.”129 By contrast, the
court seems view “fluidity of funds” as a contributing factor rather than
a necessary factor.130 Therefore, a circuit split was created regarding
whether contribution limits could be enforced against a Super PAC
which was functionally indistinguishable from a corresponding PAC,
because the standards of enmeshment and abuse of legal forms are
distinct.
C. The Second Circuit’s Holding will not Prevent the Existence or
Appearance of Corruption
It could also be argued that the removal of financial and
organizational enmeshment will not prevent the potential for corruption
which occurs when a PAC and a Super PAC exist under a common
parent organization, as was the case in Sorrell. Indeed, one could
reasonably believe that future organizations aware of the Second
Circuit’s holding would merely take the necessary steps toward ensuring
that their organizations are not functionally indistinguishable and then
continue to use the others’ legal status for mutual benefit.
Such a viewpoint raises many issues. First and foremost, it is difficult
to imagine a position which more strictly enforces contribution limits,
yet does not run contrary to the Supreme Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence or raise fundamental First Amendment concerns. In the
case of VRLC, once VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC were no longer
enmeshed financially or organizationally, they had no tangible
connection other than their connection under VRLC. To that extent,
their connection is simply that they are organizations sharing a core
belief and working toward a common goal. One of the major strengths
of the Second Circuit’s holding is that it creates a clear judicial
preference for separation within the corporate structures of the two
groups without creating any serious impediments of their rights to
pursue their common goals. Absent future Supreme Court decisions on
the subject, it is doubtful that the Second Circuit could or should have
gone any further in limiting contribution limits to Super PACs.
Though Super PACs are often painted in a corrupt light, they are
constitutional institutions so long as they do not coordinate with
candidates that they support.131 As a result, the Second Circuit was not,
and could not, attempt to outlaw independent expenditure-only
committees or chip away at their ability to perform their duties. The
court’s holding is narrow in the sense that it only attempts to close a
129. Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 145.
130. Id. at 143.
131. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/10

20

Greivenkamp: If I Go Crazy, Then Will You Still Call Me a Super PAC? How Enme

2015]

WILL YOU STILL CALL ME A SUPER PAC?

1465

loophole that raised the “danger that expenditures will be spent as quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”132 No court
would raise the argument that all Super PACs are or appear to be thinly
veiled attempts to bypass judicial limitations on committee spending.
Unless courts were to hold that another motivation existed for limiting
contributions to Super PACs besides limiting the reality or appearance
of corruption, future courts should not place any more limits upon Super
PAC contributions than those imposed by the Second Circuit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fact that courts cite the disillusionment of average citizens with
the campaign finance process suggests that courts are losing the battle to
reduce the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. It is distasteful to
think that power and influence can be purchased but it is also clear that,
in an era where $3.7 billion is spent in a year without a presidential
election, there are campaign contributors who believe that they are
buying something.133 Although this high level of spending may create
the impression that elections are bought and paid for, the normal process
of purchasing political advertisements through a Super PAC is not
illegal. Short of serious reform of current Supreme Court jurisprudence
on the subject, courts should at least be vigilant to ensure that there is
compliance with the already established limitations. To forward this
goal, courts can focus on preventing parties from circumventing
contribution limitations to PACs by making contributions to functionally
indistinguishable Super PACs.
The Second Circuit’s holding in Vermont Right to Life Committee v.
Sorrell represents a step forward in the field of campaign finance. It
prevents the appearance of corruption while imposing a minimal
restriction of committees’ First Amendment rights of political
expression. Furthermore, it contains a good deal of common sense. The
only caveat to the holding’s overall success is that it fails to set down a
fully articulated test regarding what constitutes functional
indistinguishableness. Even so, the court does provide examples of
what sorts of enmeshment constitute functional indistinguishableness as
well as examples of what sorts of activities constitute each type of
enmeshment. Therefore, short of a definitive test, the Second Circuit at
least set down repeatable guidelines for future courts to follow and
reproduce. For these reasons, the Second Circuit’s holding regarding
132. Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 145.
133. Peter Overby, What Can $3.7 Billion Buy? How About 2,969,370 Campaign Ads, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2014/10/29/359895496/what-can-37-billion-buy-how-about-2-969-370-campaign-ads.
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contribution limits to Super PACs that are functionally indistinguishable
from traditional PACs is the correct holding and should be adopted by
other circuits.
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